

ENGLE, SENATOR CLAIR (CALIF.)

"Capitol Cloakroom" at 12:30 p. m. over WTOP (Washington) and the CBS Network, 29 May 1960.

"No, it did not. I thought the President was rather lame in explaining what happened, and I thought he was very much stronger when he got on the positive side of his statement with reference to what ought to be done in the future. I thought that his explanation as to the timing of this U-2 flight was not adequate. It isn't adequate to say, well, we have to have intelligence when we can get it, regardless of the hazard that you may take. We have to weigh the possible benefits against the possible detriments, and evidently that was not done."

CARROLL, SENATOR JOHN A. (Colorado)

Congressional Record - Senate, 1960, page 10038. May 23.

"Exactly. Why did this flight take place virtually on the eve of the conference? Over 10 years ago when I was in the Congress I knew that there were forces within this Nation which believed in preventive war. I ask today whether there might be persons in the military who wished to torpedo the summit conference. Was there someone in the Central Intelligence Agency who wished to torpedo the conference? Perhaps there are people within these departments who do not desire to ease the tensions and have peace in the world."

**EVINS, REPRESENTATIVE JOE L. (TENN.)**

**Congressional Record, 16 May 1960**

"Mr. Speaker, the events of the past week on the international scene are highly disturbing. They point out dramatically that in the delicate state of relations between the nations of the world it is necessary to maintain the highest degree of responsibility in all actions we take that might affect our international relations."

FULBRIGHT, SENATOR J. W. (Arkansas)

Congressional Record - Senate, 1960, page 13673. June 28.

"Mr. President, to say that there is no good time for a failure is to overlook the fact that there are bad times and worse times. Certainly May 1 was one of the worst times. Little or no consideration was given to the international consequences of a failure on May 1. It has been argued that in view of the unbroken success of almost 4 years, there was no reason to anticipate this failure. But, Mr. President, in an enterprise as risky as this, it is imprudent not to take into account the consequences of failure. Such consequences are routinely taken into account in thousands of decisions in the day to day conduct of our affairs. All of us are accustomed, in considering any plan of action affecting either our private or public affairs, to ask ourselves the question, 'What happens if this does not work?' Nobody asked that question in connection with the May 1 flight."

Congressional Record - Senate, 1960, page 13675. June 28. (Fulbright)

"Mr. President, short of the madness of preventive war, I can think of nothing more dangerous than to resume over-flights of the Soviet Union. These over-flights were useful while they lasted, but they have now obviously become, as the professionals describe it, compromised."

HUMPHREY, SENATOR HUBERT H. (Minnesota)

Transcript of the United States Senate, Report of Proceedings.  
Hearing held before Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing  
Regarding Summit Conference of May, 1960 and Incidents  
Relating Thereto, 27 May 1960, page 67, 69

"Mr. Secretary, what do you think would happen in the United States if on our radar screen we should discover a plane flying at high altitude in this age of the fear of surprise attack, over our territory."

"I realize this, but in light of the danger of surprise attack this is what I am getting at. This is a little different may I say of a spy working the railroad yard or taking photographs or even a submarine off our coast even though this gets to be a little serious, too. But in the light of danger of surprise attack by air power, there is some difference, is there not?"

**JACKSON, SENATOR HENRY M. (Washington)**

**New York Times, "Intelligence-Policy Report," 17 June 1966**

**The following is from the text of the report on Intelligence and National Security made public today by the Senate Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery:**

**"Intelligence operations are instruments of national policy. They must be subject to effective and continuing higher review and coordination. This includes a weighing of gains against risks."**

MCCARTHY, SENATOR EUGENE J. (Minnesota)

Congressional Record - Senate, page 9079. May 9. 1960.

'It seems to me that the decision to fly a plane across the heartland of Russia is one which should have been made at the highest levels of Government in this country. I will not dispute the statement of the administration that the President knew nothing about it. But if he did not--and I hope he did--I say that that fact is a worse indictment than if he had knowledge of it and had approved it.'

MEYER, REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM H. (Vermont)

Congressional Record - House, 1960. May 17.

"No man can tell me that I have any greater duty than to safeguard the rights of Congress and our people when the threat of actions leading to war are so ominous. War must be prevented, and at the very least it must not come while our people and Congress are purposefully kept in the dark as to facts and acts that are by law supposed to be available to them and under their control. No one has the right to arrogate special powers to himself especially when they belong equally to others and particularly when the life and future of our people and country are at stake as the clouds of a war of unknown destructiveness gather in the sky."

"Even our own Government forbids commercial planes of other countries to enter our airspace without a permit from the Civil Aeronautics Authority; and, certainly, if this is the case, it is obvious that the intrusion of espionage and military planes would certainly be prohibited and that they would not be permitted to invade our airspace."



MONRONEY, SENATOR A. S. MIKE (Oklahoma)

Congressional Record - Senate, 1960, page 19919. May 23.

"We are not likely to forget the fumbles that preceded the Suez crisis on the eve of the 1956 election.

"But nothing, of course, can justify Mr. Khrushchev's contemptuous conduct, especially after President Eisenhower had announced that our espionage flights had been called off. But his anger was predictable, if not his violence. How would we feel if Soviet spy planes based in Cuba were flying over Cape Canaveral and Oak Ridge. And also we could predict with certainty his efforts to use the situation to split the Western Alliance and intimidate the countries where our bases are situated."

MORSE, SENATOR WAYNE (OREGON)

Congressional Record - Senate, 1960, page 14269. 1 July 1960

"In my judgment, the use of the U-2 spy plane over Russia constituted an act of aggression on the part of the United States against a foreign power. Not only this particular flight, but every U-2 flight, in my judgment, was an act of aggression on the part of the United States. Such flights over Russia constituted a danger of provoking war. Under the facts and circumstances, in my judgment, brought out in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee investigation of this blunder by the Eisenhower administration was there any justification, under international comity, for the flights in the first instance? Neither would there be any justification for a continuation of such flights."

Congressional Record - Senate, 1960, page 10033. 23 May 1960.

"That is no surprise to anybody. But if I have ever listened to a non sequitur argument, that is one, and I am accustomed to hear such arguments from the Vice President of the United States. What does the detection of intelligence personnel have to do with a course of action followed by the United States in regard to what is interpreted around the world as a form of constructive aggression? That is exactly what the sending of the spy plane over Russia was. It was a form of constructive aggression. We can alibi it and rationalize it all we want to, and we can wave the American flag into tatters over it, but the fact remains that our friends and enemies alike around the world are going to decree that we cannot justify our course of action in the spy plane incident under international comity well recognized in the field of espionage."

"At no time, as I sat in the Committee on Foreign Relations or on the floor, and as I voted for the use of funds for intelligence work, was there even a whisper from anyone within the administration, military or civilian, that any of that money would be used for the sending of an instrumentality of war over a foreign sovereign power."

MORSE, SENATOR WAYNE (OREGON)

Congressional Record - Senate, 1960, page 10034. 23 May 1960.

"Let us not forget in these days of high hysteria, bordering almost on panic, in the thinking of many people, one never knows when such an incident will cause some misguided, uninformed, emotionally aroused person in some foreign country to make a false deduction as to the purpose of such a plane, and a nuclear war will be started thereby."

"It was a risk that the administration had no moral right to ever run. They ran it. The plane was shot down. I do not know what the facts are. We hope to get the facts after a thorough investigation. I do not know yet how the plane was shot down."

Article in Baltimore Sun, May 14, 1960, by Ernest B. Furgurson.  
"Morse Talks to Collegians; 2000 Here Cheer Kennedy"

"Senator Morse also strongly condemned this country's 'spy-plane' reconnaissance flights over Russia, as well as the Soviet Premier's reaction in the incident."

"Russian fighter planes could have 'encircled it and forced it down,' he said, but instead it was shot down for propaganda purposes."

"Neither can we justify having the plane there . . . . Sooner or later we are going to have incident or accident that will release the first bomb, and the holocaust will be on,' he said."

Article in New York Times, May 15, 1960. "Morse Criticizes U-2 Plane Action"

"Senator Wayne Morse, Democrat of Oregon, said tonight the United States was an aggressor in sending a U-2 spy plane deep into the Soviet Union."

"As he had earlier, Mr. Morse criticized the operation as risky and something that could lead to nuclear war if continued."

"There is no justification for getting military intelligence through aggression,' he said, adding that President Eisenhower ought to be reprimanded for it."

MORSE, SENATOR WAYNE (Oregon)

Transcript of the United States Senate, Report of Proceedings,  
Hearing held before Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearing  
Regarding Summit Conference of May, 1960 and Incidents  
Relating Thereto, 27 May 1960, page 76-78

"Mr. Secretary, do you think the public knowledge now of these American spy plane flights over Russia has played into the hands of Communist propaganda with the Russian people themselves by increasing the fear, no matter how unfounded we know it is, the fear of the Russian people that our real objective is to make war against Russia?"

"You do not think then that the American people are entitled to know -- in other words, to evaluate both their own government's policies and the policies of our Allies, what the position of the Allies is in regard to conducting spy plane flights over foreign territory?"

"The Chairman. As I understand it, they have been publicly stating their solidarity and support of our position."

"I know of no public statement, Mr. Chairman, that they support an Allied policy of spy plane flights over foreign territory. Of course, if that is their position, the world ought to know it and know that we are that much closer then to war."

ROBERTSON, SENATOR A. WILLIS (Virginia)

Congressional Record - Senate, 1960, page 9078. 9 May.

"It was not only a tragic blunder of trying to send a plane across the continent of Russia, but in violating the neutrality of two friendly nations, for the morning paper indicates that the flight was to start in Pakistan and to end in the friendly country of Norway. That was a gap. Someone made a terrible mistake in ordering the flight, and it is the second costly mistake in recent years. "

SYMINGTON, SENATOR STUART (Missouri)

City Side, at 12:30 p.m. over WTOP-TV (Washington), 14 May 1960

"I would never have anybody say in an administration that I ran that people in high authority knew nothing about this mission, Mr. Woods. I would take steps to see that a matter of this scope and importance was known at the highest level. Espionage is part of our life, and there's no use crying over spilt milk, but it did seem unfortunate to me that, first, the story was denied and the way it was denied, and then instead of us having a united picture on it, later on each department interested, you might say, had a different picture and finally there was a complete reversal of our position.

"I would hope that if we had decided to send a plane across a country behind the Iron Curtain, to the degree and the extent it apparently is obvious now that we've done, that that would be a matter of interest and grave concern to the highest people in our government. It was apparently something that was decided at a considerably lower level; at least the statement was made that nobody in high authority knew about it."

TALMADGE, SENATOR HERMAN E. (GA.)

Congressional Record - Senate, 19 May 1960, page 9892.

"The recent destruction in Russia of a CIA observation plane indicates how easily a cold war could suddenly turn into a shooting war. It illustrates the urgent need for a program of international disarmament, while at the same time casting a great shadow over prospects for a successful summit conference in Paris."

VANIK, REPRESENTATIVE CHARLES A. (OHIO)

Congressional Record - House, 1960, page 9737. 17 May 1960.

"Even our own Government forbids commercial planes of other countries to enter our airspace without a permit from the Civil Aeronautics Authority; and, certainly, if this is the case, it is obvious that the intrusion of espionage and military planes would certainly be prohibited and that they would not be permitted to invade our airspace."



WOLF, REPRESENTATIVE LEONARD G. (Iowa)

Congressional Record - House, 1960, page 9486. 12 May 1960

"Mr. Speaker, the lesson we should have learned from the experience of the U-2 is how quickly, in international relations, great powers can be brought to the brink of war, and, in truth, we should thank God that the world is not in ashes today. It would behoove those men who God and the people of the United States have trusted with their topmost leadership to spend a little time in serious meditation about the awful consequences of such obstructionist tactics in the question of nuclear control."

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